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INERTIAL GAME DYNAMICS AND
APPLICATIONS TO CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION
RIDA LARAKI AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS
Abstract. Aiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-
term rationality properties, we derive a second-order inertial system that builds
on the widely studied “heavy ball with friction” optimization method. By ex-
ploiting a well-known link between the replicator dynamics and the Shahsha-
hani geometry on the space of mixed strategies, the dynamics are stated in
a Riemannian geometric framework where trajectories are accelerated by the
players’ unilateral payoff gradients and they slow down near Nash equilibria.
Surprisingly (and in stark contrast to another second-order variant of the repli-
cator dynamics), the inertial replicator dynamics are not well-posed; on the
other hand, it is possible to obtain a well-posed system by endowing the mixed
strategy space with a different Hessian–Riemannian (HR) metric structure and
we characterize those HR geometries that do so. In the single-agent version
of the dynamics (corresponding to constrained optimization over simplex-like
objects), we show that regular maximum points of smooth functions attract
all nearby solution orbits with low initial speed. More generally, we estab-
lish an inertial variant of the so-called “folk theorem” of evolutionary game
theory and we show that strict equilibria are attracting in asymmetric (multi-
population) games – provided of course that the dynamics are well-posed. A
similar asymptotic stability result is obtained for evolutionarily stable states
in symmetric (single-population) games.
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1. Introduction
One of the most widely studied dynamics for learning and evolution in games
is the classical replicator equation of Taylor and Jonker [46], first introduced as
a model of population evolution under natural selection. Stated in the context of
finite N -player games with each player k ∈ {1, . . . , N} choosing an action from a
finite set Ak, these dynamics take the form:
x˙kα = xkα
[
vkα(x)−
∑
β∈Ak
xkβvkβ(x)
]
, (RD)
where xk = (xkα)α∈Ak denotes the mixed strategy of player k (i.e. xkα repre-
sents the probability with which player k selects α ∈ Ak) while vkα(x) denotes the
expected payoff to action α ∈ Ak in the mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ).1
Accordingly, a considerable part of the literature has focused on the long-term
rationality properties of the replicator dynamics. First, building on early work
by Akin [2] and Nachbar [31], Samuelson and Zhang [38] showed that dominated
strategies become extinct along every interior trajectory of (RD). Second, the so-
called “folk theorem” of evolutionary game theory states that a) Nash equilibria are
stationary in (RD); b) limit points of interior trajectories are Nash; and c) strict
Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable under (RD) [18, 19]. Finally, when the
game admits a potential function (in the sense of [30]), interior trajectories of (RD)
converge to the set of Nash equilibria that are local maximizers of the game’s
potential [18].
To a large extent, the strong rationality properties of the replicator dynam-
ics are owed to their dual nature as a reinforcement learning/unilateral optimiza-
tion device. The former aspect is provided by the link between (RD) and the
so-called exponential weights (EW) algorithm where players choose an action with
probability that is exponentially proportional to its cumulative payoff over time
[23, 28, 36, 44, 48]. In continuous time, this process formally amounts to the dy-
namical system:
y˙kα = vkα,
xkα =
exp(ykα)∑
β exp(ykβ)
,
(EW)
and, as can be seen by a simple differentiation, (EW) is equivalent to (RD).
Dually, from an optimization perspective, the replicator dynamics can also be
seen as a unilateral gradient ascent scheme where, to maximize their individual
payoffs, players ascend the (unilateral) gradient of their payoff functions with re-
spect to a particular geometry on the simplex – the so-called Shahshahani metric,
given by the metric tensor gαβ(x) = δαβ/xα for xα > 0 [41]. In this light, (RD)
can be recast as:
x˙k = grad
S
k uk(x), (1.1)
where gradSk uk(x) denotes the unilateral Shahshahani gradient of the expected
payoff function uk(x) =
∑
α xkαvkα(x) of player k [1, 16, 17, 41].
2 Owing to this
last interpretation, (RD) becomes a proper Shahshahani gradient ascent scheme
in the class of potential games: the game’s potential acts as a global Lyapunov
1In the mass-action interpretation of population games, xkα represents the proportion of play-
ers in population k that use strategy α ∈ Ak and vkα(x) is the associated fitness.
2For our purposes, “unilateral” here means differentiation with respect to the variables that are
directly under the player’s control (as opposed to all variables, including other players’ strategies).
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function for (RD), so interior trajectories converge to the set of Nash equilibria
that are local maximizers thereof [17, 18].3
Despite these important rationality properties, the replicator dynamics fail to
eliminate weakly dominated strategies [37]; furthermore, as is the case with all first-
order game dynamics [15], they do not converge to Nash equilibrium in all games.
Thus, motivated by the success of second-order, “heavy ball with friction” methods
in optimization [3, 4, 6, 7, 14, 34], our first goal in this paper is to examine whether
it is possible to obtain better convergence properties and/or escape the first-order
impossibility results of [15] in a second-order setting.
To that end, if we replace y˙ by y¨ in (EW), we obtain the dynamics:
y¨kα = vkα,
xkα =
exp(ykα)∑
β exp(ykβ)
.
(EW2)
These second-order exponential learning dynamics were studied in the very recent
paper [20] where it was shown that (EW2) is equivalent to the second-order repli-
cator equation:
x¨kα = xkα
[
vkα(x)−
∑
β∈Ak
xkβvkβ(x)
]
+ xkα
[
x˙2kα
/
x2kα −
∑
β∈Ak
x˙2kβ
/
xkβ
]
.
(RD2)
Importantly, under (EW2)/(RD2), even weakly dominated strategies become ex-
tinct; such strategies may survive in perpetuity under the first-order dynamics
(RD), so this represents a marked advantage for using second-order methods in
games.
That being said, the second-order system (RD2) has no obvious ties to the gra-
dient ascent properties of its first-order counterpart, so it is not clear whether its
trajectories converge to Nash equilibrium in potential games. On that account, a
natural way to regain this connection would be to see whether (RD2) can be linked
to the “heavy ball with friction” system:
D2xk
Dt2
= gradSk uk(x)− ηx˙k, (1.2)
where D
2xk
Dt2 denotes the covariant acceleration of xk under the Shahshahani metric
and η ≥ 0 is a friction coefficient, included in (1.2) to slow down trajectories and
enable convergence. In this way, if the game admits a potential function Φ, the total
energy E(x, x˙) = 12 ‖x˙‖2−Φ(x) will be Lyapunov under (1.2) (by construction), so
(1.2) is intuitively expected to converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game
that are local maximizers of Φ.
3By contrast, using ordinary Euclidean gradients and projections leads to the well-known
(Euclidean) projection dynamics of Friedman [13]; however, because Euclidean trajectories may
collide with the boundary of the game’s state space in finite time, the folk theorem of evolutionary
game theory does not hold in a Euclidean context, even when the game is a potential one [40].
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Writing everything out in components (see Section 2 for detailed definitions and
derivations), we obtain the inertial replicator dynamics:4
x¨kα = xkα
[
vkα(x)−
∑
β∈Ak
xkβvkβ(x)
]
+
1
2
xkα
[
x˙2kα
/
x2kα −
∑
β∈Ak
x˙2kβ
/
xkβ
]
− ηx˙kα,
(IRD)
with the “inertial” velocity-dependent term of (IRD) stemming from covariant dif-
ferentiation under the Shahshahani metric. Rather surprisingly (and in stark con-
trast to the first-order case), we see that (EW2) and (1.2) lead to dynamics that
are similar but not identical: in the baseline, frictionless case (η = 0), (RD2) and
(IRD) differ by a factor of 1/2 in their velocity-dependent terms. Further, in an
even more surprising twist, this seemingly innocuous factor actually leads to drastic
differences: solutions to (IRD) typically fail to exist for all time, so the rationality
properties of the first- and second-order replicator dynamics do not (in fact, cannot)
extend to (IRD).
The reason that (IRD) fails to be well-posed is deeply geometric and has to
do with the fact that the Shahshahani simplex is isometric to an orthant of the
Euclidean sphere (a bounded set that cannot restrain second-order “heavy ball”
trajectories). On that account, the second main goal of our paper is to examine
whether the “heavy ball with friction” optimization principle that underlies (1.2)
can lead to a well-posed system with good rationality properties under a different
choice of geometry.
To that end, we focus on the class of Hessian–Riemannian (HR) metrics [11, 43]
that have been studied extensively in the context of convex programming [5, 9]; in
fact, the proposed class of dynamics provides a second-order, inertial extension of
the gradient-like dynamics of [9] to a game-theoretic setting with several agents,
each seeking to maximize their individual payoff function. The reason for focusing
on the class of HR metrics is that they are generated by taking the Hessian of
a steep, strongly convex function over the problem’s state space (a simplex-like
object in our case), so, thanks to the geometry’s “steepness” at the boundary of
the feasible region, the induced first-order gradient flows are well-posed. Of course,
as the Shahshahani case shows,5 this “steepness” is not enough to guarantee well-
posedness in a second-order setting; however, if the geometry is “steep enough” (in
a certain, precise sense), the resulting dynamics are well-posed and exhibit a fair
set of long-term rationality properties (including convergence to equilibrium in the
class of potential games).
The breakdown of our analysis is as follows: in Section 2, we present an explicit
derivation of the class of inertial game dynamics under study and we discuss their
“energy minimization” properties in the class of potential games. Our asymptotic
analysis begins in Section 3 where we discuss the well-posedness problems that arise
in the case of the replicator dynamics and we derive a geometric characterization
of the HR structures that lead to a well-posed flow: as it turns out, global solutions
4We are very grateful to Jérôme Bolte for suggesting the term “inertial”.
5In a certain sense, the Shahshahani metric (and the induced replicator dynamics) is the
archetypal Hessian–Riemannian metric, obtained by taking the Hessian of the Gibbs negative
entropy.
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exist if and only if the interior of the game’s strategy space can be mapped iso-
metrically to a closed (but not compact) hypersurface of some ambient Euclidean
space.
Our rationality and convergence results are presented in Section 4. First, from an
optimization viewpoint, we show that isolated maximizers of smooth functions de-
fined on simplex-like objects are asymptotically stable; as a result, Nash equilibria
that are potential maximizers are asymptotically stable in potential games. More
generally, we establish the following “folk theorem” for general (multi-population)
games: a) Nash equilibria are stationary; b) if an interior orbit converges, its limit
is a restricted equilibrium; and c) strict equilibria attract all nearby trajectories.
Finally, in the framework of symmetric, single-population games, we show that
evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) are asymptotically stable in doubly symmetric
games, providing in this way an extension of the corresponding result for the stan-
dard (single-population) replicator dynamics [18]; by contrast, this result does not
hold under the second-order replicator dynamics (RD2).
For completeness, some elements of Riemannian geometry are discussed in Ap-
pendix A (mostly to fix terminology and notation); finally, to streamline the flow of
ideas in the paper, some proofs and calculations have been delegated to Appendix
B.
1.1. Notational conventions. If W is a vector space, we will write W ∗ for its
dual and 〈ω|w〉 for the pairing between the primal vector w ∈ W and the dual
vector ω ∈ W ∗. By contrast, an inner product on W will be denoted by 〈·, ·〉,
writing e.g. 〈w,w′〉 for the product between the (primal) vectors w,w′ ∈W .
The real space spanned by the finite set S = {sα}nα=0 will be denoted by RS and
we will write {es}s∈S for its canonical basis. In a slight abuse of notation, we will
also use α to refer interchangeably to either sα or eα and we will write δαβ for the
Kronecker delta symbols on S. The set ∆(S) of probability measures on S will be
identified with the n-dimensional simplex ∆ = {x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0}
of RS and the relative interior of ∆ will be denoted by ∆◦. Finally, if {Sk}k∈N
is a finite family of finite sets, we will use the shorthand (αk;α−k) for the tuple
(. . . , αk−1, αk, αk+1, . . . ); also, when there is no danger of confusion, we will write∑k
α instead of
∑
α∈Sk .
1.2. Definitions from game theory. A finite game in normal form is a tuple
G ≡ G(N,A, u) consisting of a) a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , N}; b) a finite
set Ak of actions (or pure strategies) per player k ∈ N; and c) the players’ payoff
functions uk : A→ R, where A ≡
∏
k Ak denotes the set of all joint action profiles
(α1, . . . , αN ). The set of mixed strategies of player k will be denoted by Xk ≡ ∆(Ak)
and we will write X ≡ ∏k Xk for the game’s state space – i.e. the space of mixed
strategy profiles x = (x1, . . . , xN ). Unless mentioned otherwise, we will write Vk ≡
RAk and V ≡∏k Vk ∼= R∐kAk for the ambient spaces of Xk and X respectively.
The expected payoff of player k in the strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X is
uk(x) =
∑1
α1
· · ·
∑N
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · xN,αN , (1.3)
where uk(α1, . . . , αN ) denotes the payoff of player k in the pure profile (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈
A. Accordingly, the payoff corresponding to α ∈ Ak in the mixed profile x ∈ X is
vkα(x) =
∑1
α1
· · ·
∑N
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · δαk,α · · · xN,αN , (1.4)
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and we have
uk(x) =
∑k
α
xkαvkα(x) = 〈vk(x)|xk〉 (1.5)
where vk(x) = (vkα(x))α∈Ak denotes the payoff vector of player k at x ∈ X.
In the above, vk is treated as a dual vector in V ∗k that is paired to the mixed
strategy xk ∈ Xk; on that account, mixed strategies will be regarded throughout
this paper as primal variables and payoff vectors as duals. Moreover, note that
vkα(x) does not depend on xkα so we have vkα = ∂uk∂xkα ; in view of this, we will
often refer to vkα as the marginal utility of action α ∈ Ak and we will identify
vk(x) ∈ V ∗ with the (unilateral) differential of uk(x) with respect to xk.
Finally, following [30, 39], we will say that G is a potential game when it admits
a potential function Φ: X→ R such that:
vkα(x) =
∂Φ
∂xkα
for all x ∈ X and for all α ∈ Ak, k ∈ N, (1.6)
or, equivalently:
uk(xk;x−k)− uk(x′k;x−k) = Φ(xk;x−k)− Φ(x′k;x−k), (1.7)
for all xk ∈ Xk and for all x−k ∈ X−k ≡
∏
` 6=k X`, k ∈ N.
2. Inertial game dynamics
In this section, we introduce the class of inertial game dynamics that comprise
the main focus of our paper. For notational simplicity, most of our derivations are
presented in the case of a single player with a finite action set A = {0, . . . , n}; the
extension to the general, multi-player case is straightforward and simply involves
reinstating the player index k where necessary.
As we explained in the introduction, the dynamics under study in this unilateral
framework boil down to the “heavy ball with friction” system:
D2x
Dt2
= gradu(x)− ηx˙, (HBF)
where gradients and covariant derivatives are taken with respect to a Riemannian
metric g on the game’s state space X ≡ ∆(A) – for a brief discussion of the neces-
sary concepts from Riemannian geometry, the reader is referred to Appendix A. Of
course, in the ordinary Euclidean case (where covariant and ordinary derivatives
coincide), there is no barrier term in (HBF) that can constrain the dynamics’ solu-
tion trajectories to remain in X for all time; as such, we begin by presenting a class
of Riemannian metrics with a more appropriate boundary behavior.
2.1. Hessian–Riemannian metrics. Following Bolte and Teboulle [9] and Al-
varez et al. [5], we begin by endowing the positive orthant C ≡ RA++ ≡ {x ∈ RA :
xα > 0} of the ambient space V = RA of X with a Riemannian metric g(x) that
blows up at the boundary hyperplanes xα = 0 – raising in this way an inherent
geometric barrier on the boundary bd(X) of X.
A standard device to achieve this blow-up is to define g(x) as the Hessian of a
strongly convex function h : C → R that becomes infinitely steep at the boundary
of C [5, 9, 29, 42]. To that end, let θ : [0,+∞) → R ∪ {+∞} be a C∞-smooth
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function satisfying the Legendre-type properties [5, 9, 35]:6
1. θ(x) <∞ for all x > 0.
2. limx→0+ θ′(x) = −∞.
3. θ′′(x) > 0 and θ′′′(x) < 0 for all x > 0.
(L)
We then define the associated penalty function
h(x) =
n∑
α=0
θ(xα), (2.1)
and we define a metric g on C by taking the Hessian of h, viz.:
gαβ =
∂2h
∂xα∂xβ
= θ′′αδαβ , (2.2)
where the shorthand θ′′α, α = 0, . . . , n, stands for θ′′(xα). In other words, the
Hessian–Riemannian metric induced by θ is the field of positive-definite matrices
g(x) = diag(θ′′(x0), . . . , θ′′(xn)), x ∈ C. (2.3)
With h strictly convex (recall that θ′′ > 0), it follows that g is indeed a Riemannian
metric tensor on C; following [5], we will refer to θ as the kernel of g.
Remark 2.1. The penalty function h of (2.1) is closely related to the class of control
cost functions used to define quantal responses in the theory of discrete choice
[27, 47] and the class of regularizer functions used in mirror descent methods for
optimization and online learning [29, 32, 33, 42]; for a detailed discussion, we refer
the reader to [5, 9, 10]. In fact, more general Hessian–Riemannian structures can
be obtained by considering C2-smooth strongly convex functions h : C → R that do
not necessarily admit a decomposition of the form (2.1). Most of our results can be
extended to this non-separable setting but the calculations involved are significantly
more tedious, so we will focus on the simpler, decomposable framework of (2.1).7
Example 2.1 (The Shahshahani metric). The most widely studied example of
a non-Euclidean HR structure on the simplex is generated by the entropic kernel
θS(x) = x log x. By differentiation, we then obtain the Shahshahani metric [1, 5,
41]:
gS(x) = diag(1/x0, . . . , 1/xn), x ∈ C, (2.4)
or, in coordinates:
gSαβ(x) = δαβ/xβ . (2.5)
Example 2.2 (The log-barrier). Another important example with close ties to
proximal barrier methods in optimization (see e.g. [5, 9] and references therein) is
given by the logarithmic barrier kernel θL(x) = − log x [5, 8, 12, 26]. The associated
penalty function is h(x) = −∑α log xα and its Hessian generates the metric
gLαβ(x) = δαβ/x
2
β , (2.6)
6Legendre-type functions are usually defined without the regularity requirement θ′′′ < 0.
This assumption can be relaxed without significantly affecting our results but we will keep it
for simplicity.
7In particular, the results that do not hold verbatim are those that call explicitly on θ – most
notably, Corollary 3.6.
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or, in matrix form:
gL(x) = diag(1/x20, . . . , 1/x
2
n), x ∈ C. (2.7)
An important qualitative difference between the kernels θS and θL is that the former
remains bounded as x→ 0+ whereas the latter blows up; this difference will play a
key role with regard to the existence of global solutions.
2.2. Derivation of the dynamics and examples. Having endowed C with a
Hessian–Riemannian structure g with kernel θ, we continue with the calculation of
the gradient and acceleration terms of (HBF). To that end, it will be convenient
to introduce the coordinate transformation
pi0 : (x0, x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (x1, . . . , xn), (2.8)
which maps the affine hull of X isomorphically to V0 ≡ Rn by eliminating x0. The
(right) inverse of this transformation is given by the injection
ι0 : (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (1−
∑n
α=1 xα, x1, . . . , xn), (2.9)
so (2.8) provides a global coordinate chart for X that will allow us to carry out the
necessary geometric calculations.
As a first step, let {eα}nα=0 and {e˜µ}nµ=1 denote the canonical bases of V and
V0 respectively. Then, under ι0, e˜µ is pushed forward to (ι0)∗e˜µ = eµ − e0,8 so the
component-wise expression of g in the coordinates (2.8) is:
g˜µν = 〈eµ − e0, eν − e0〉 = gµν + g00 = θ′′µδµν + θ′′0 . (2.10)
With this coordinate expression at hand, let f : X◦ → R be a (smooth) function
on X◦ and write f˜ = f ◦ ι0, (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ f(1−
∑n
α=1, x1, . . . , xn) for its coordi-
nate expression under (2.9). Referring to Appendix A for the required background
definitions,9 the gradient of f with respect to g may be expressed as:
grad f = g−1 · ∇f =
n∑
µ,ν=1
g˜µν
∂f˜
∂xν
e˜µ (2.11)
where g˜µν is the inverse matrix of g˜µν . By the inversion formula of Lemma B.1, we
then obtain
g˜µν =
δµν
θ′′µ
− Θ
′′
θ′′µθ′′ν
, (2.12)
where Θ′′ =
(∑
β 1/θ
′′
β
)−1 denotes the “harmonic sum” of the metric weights θ′′β .10
Thus, by carrying out the summation in (2.11), we get the coordinate expression:
grad f =
n∑
µ=1
1
θ′′µ
[
∂f˜
∂xµ
−Θ′′
n∑
ν=1
1
θ′′ν
∂f˜
∂xν
]
e˜µ. (2.13)
Accordingly, if the domain of f : X◦ → R extends to an open neighborhood of X◦
(so ∂µf˜ = ∂µf − ∂0f for all x ∈ X◦), some algebra readily gives:
grad f =
n∑
α=0
1
θ′′α
[
∂f
∂xα
−Θ′′
n∑
β=0
1
θ′′β
∂f
∂xβ
]
eα. (2.14)
8Simply note that the image of the coordinate curve γµ(t) = te˜µ under ι0 is −te0 + teµ.
9We only mention here that grad f is characterized by the chain rule property d
dt
f(x(t)) =
〈x˙(t), grad f(x(t))〉 for every smooth curve x(t) on X◦.
10Note that Θ′′ is not a second derivative; we are only using this notation for visual consistency.
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With regard to the inertial acceleration term of (HBF), taking the covariant
derivative of x˙ in the coordinate frame (2.8) yields:
D2xµ
Dt2
= x¨µ +
n∑
ν,ρ=1
Γ˜µνρx˙ν x˙ρ, µ = 1, . . . , n, (2.15)
where the so-called Christoffel symbols Γ˜µνρ of g are given by:
11
Γ˜µνρ =
1
2
n∑
κ=1
g˜µκ
(
∂g˜κν
∂xρ
+
∂g˜ρκ
∂xν
− ∂g˜νρ
∂xκ
)
. (2.16)
After a somewhat cumbersome calculation (cf. Appendix B), we then get:
D2xµ
Dt2
= x¨µ +
1
2
θ′′′µ
θ′′µ
x˙2µ −
1
2
Θ′′
θ′′µ
 n∑
ν=1
θ′′′ν
θ′′ν
x˙2ν +
θ′′′0
θ′′0
(
n∑
ν=1
x˙ν
)2 , (2.17)
so, with x˙0 = −
∑n
ν=1 x˙ν , (2.15) becomes:
D2xα
Dt2
= x¨α +
1
2
1
θ′′α
[
θ′′′α x˙
2
α −
n∑
β=0
(
Θ′′
/
θ′′β
)
θ′′′β x˙
2
β
]
. (2.18)
In view of the above, putting together (2.14), (2.18) and (HBF), we obtain the
inertial game dynamics:
x¨kα =
1
θ′′kα
[
vkα −
∑k
β
(
Θ′′k
/
θ′′kβ
)
vkβ
]
− 1
2
1
θ′′kα
[
θ′′′kαx˙
2
kα −
∑k
β
(
Θ′′k
/
θ′′kβ
)
θ′′′kβ x˙
2
kβ
]
− ηx˙kα,
(ID)
where, in obvious notation, we have reinstated the player index k and we have used
the fact that vkα = ∂uk∂xkα . Since these dynamics comprise the main focus of our
paper, we immediately proceed to two representative examples:
Example 2.3 (The inertial replicator dynamics). The Shahshahani kernel θ(x) =
x log x has θ′′(x) = 1/x and θ′′′(x) = −1/x2, so (ID) leads to the inertial replicator
dynamics:
x¨kα = xkα
[
vkα −
∑k
β
xkβvkβ
]
+
1
2
xkα
[
x˙2kα
/
x2kα −
∑k
β
x˙2kβ
/
xkβ
]
−ηx˙kα. (IRD)
As we mentioned in the introduction, the only notable difference between (IRD) and
the second-order replicator dynamics of exponential learning (RD2) is the factor 1/2
in the RHS of (IRD) (the friction term ηx˙ is not important for this comparison).
Despite the innocuous character of this scaling-like factor,12 we shall see in the
following section that (IRD) and (RD2) behave in drastically different ways.
11For a more detailed discussion the reader is again referred to Appendix A. We only mention
here that the covariant derivative in (2.15) is defined so that the system’s energy E(x, x˙) =
1
2
‖x˙‖2 − u(x) is a constant of motion under (HBF) when η = 0 (and Lyapunov when η > 0).
12It is tempting to interpret the factor 1/2 in (IRD) as a change of time with respect to (RD2),
but the presence of x˙2 precludes as much.
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Example 2.4 (The inertial log-barrier dynamics). The log-barrier kernel θ(x) =
− log x has θ′′(x) = 1/x2 and θ′′′(x) = −2/x3, so we obtain the inertial log-barrier
dynamics:
x¨kα = x
2
kα
[
vkα − r−2k
∑k
β
x2kβvkβ
]
+ x2kα
[
x˙2kα
/
x3kα − r−2k
∑k
β
x˙2kβ
/
xkβ
]
− ηx˙kα,
(ILD)
where r2k =
∑k
β x
2
kβ . The first order analogue of these dynamics – namely, the
system x˙kα = x2kα
(
vkα − r−2k
∑
kβ x
2
kβvkβ
)
– has been studied extensively in the
context of linear programming and convex optimization [5, 8, 9, 12, 26], while its
game-theoretic properties are discussed in [29].
3. Basic properties and well-posedness
In this section, we examine the energy dissipation and well-posedness properties
of (ID). For convenience, we will work with the single-agent version of the dynamics
(ID) with v = ∇Φ for some Lipschitz continuous and sufficiently smooth function
Φ on X.13
3.1. Friction and Dissipation of Energy. We begin by showing that the sys-
tem’s total energy
E(x, x˙) =
1
2
‖x˙‖2 − Φ(x) (3.1)
is dissipated along the inertial dynamics (ID) for η > 0 (or is a constant of motion
in the frictionless case η = 0).
Proposition 3.1. The total energy E(x, x˙) is nonincreasing along any interior
solution orbit of (ID); specifically:
E˙ = −2ηK = −η ‖x˙‖2 , (3.2)
where K = 12 ‖x˙‖2 is the system’s kinetic energy.
Proof. By differentiating (3.1) along x˙(t), we readily obtain:
E˙ = ∇x˙E = 12∇x˙ 〈x˙, x˙〉 − ∇x˙Φ = 〈∇x˙x˙, x˙〉 − 〈dΦ|x˙〉
=
〈
D2x
Dt2
, x˙
〉
− 〈grad Φ, x˙〉 = 〈grad Φ− ηx˙, x˙〉 − 〈grad Φ, x˙〉
= −η 〈x˙, x˙〉 = −2ηK, (3.3)
where we used the metric compatibility (A.13) of ∇ in the first line, and the defi-
nition of the dynamics (ID) in the second. 
Proposition 3.1 shows that, for η > 0, the system’s total energy E = K − Φ is
a Lyapunov function for (ID); by contrast, in first-order HR gradient flows [5, 9],
it is the maximization objective Φ that acts as a Lyapunov function. As such, in
the second-order context of (ID), it will be important to show that the system’s
kinetic energy eventually vanishes – so that Φ becomes an “asymptotic” Lyapunov
function. To that end, we have:
13Here and in what follows, it will be convenient to assume that Φ is defined on an open
neighborhood of X. This assumption facilitates the use of standard coordinates for calculations,
but none of our results depend on this device.
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Proposition 3.2. Let x(t) be a solution trajectory of (ID) that is defined for all
t ≥ 0. If η > 0, then limt→∞ x˙(t) = 0.
To prove Proposition 3.2, we will require the following intermediate result:
Lemma 3.3. Let x(t) be an interior solution of (ID) that is defined for all t ≥ 0.
If η > 0, the rate of change of the system’s kinetic energy is bounded from above
for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. By differentiating K with respect to time, we readily obtain:
K˙ = ∇x˙K =
〈
D2x
Dt2
, x˙
〉
= 〈grad Φ− ηx˙, x˙〉
= 〈dΦ|x˙〉 − η ‖x˙‖2 =
∑
β
∂Φ
∂xβ
x˙β − η
∑
β
θ′′β x˙
2
β
≤ A
∑
β
|x˙β | − ηB
∑
β
x˙2β , (3.4)
where A = sup |∂βΦ| < ∞ and B = inf{θ′′(x) : x ∈ (0, 1)}. With A finite and
B > 0 (on account of the Legendre properties of θ), the maximum value of the
above expression is (n+ 1)A2/(4ηB), so K˙ is bounded from above. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let E(t) = 12 ‖x˙(t)‖2−Φ(x(t)) be the system’s energy at
time t. Proposition 3.1 shows that E˙ = −η ‖x˙‖2 = −2ηK ≤ 0, so E(t) decreases
to some value E∗ ∈ R; as a result, we also get ∫∞
0
K(s) ds = (2η)−1 (E(0)− E∗) <
∞. This suggests that limt→∞K(t) = 0, but since there exist positive integrable
functions which do not converge to 0 as t→∞, our assertion does not yet follow.
Assume therefore that lim supt→∞K(t) = 3ε > 0. In that case, there exists by
continuity an increasing sequence of times tn → ∞ such that K(tn) > 2ε for all
n. Accordingly, let sn = sup{t : t ≤ tn and K(t) < ε}: since K is integrable and
non-negative, we also have sn → ∞ (because lim inf K(t) = 0), so, by descending
to a subsequence of tn, we may assume without loss of generality that sn+1 > tn
for all n. Hence, if we let Jn = [sn, tn], we have:∫ ∞
0
K(s) ds ≥
∑∞
n=1
∫
Jn
K ≥ ε
∑∞
n=1
|Jn|, (3.5)
which shows that the Lebesgue measure |Jn| of Jn vanishes as t→∞. Consequently,
by the mean value theorem, it follows that there exists ξn ∈ (sn, tn) such that
K˙(ξn) =
K(tn)−K(sn)
|Jn| >
ε
|Jn| , (3.6)
and since |Jn| → 0, we conclude that lim sup K˙(t) = ∞. This contradicts the
conclusion of Lemma 3.3, so we get K(t)→ 0 and x˙(t)→ 0. 
Remark 3.1. The proof technique above easily extends to the Euclidean case, thus
providing an alternative proof of the velocity integrability and convergence part of
Theorem 2.1 in [3]; furthermore, if we consider a Hessian-driven damping term in
(ID) as in [4], the estimate (3.4) remains essentially unchanged and our approach
may also be used to prove the corresponding claim of Theorem 2.1 in [4].
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3.2. Well-posedness and Euclidean coordinates. Clearly, Proposition 3.2 ap-
plies if and only if the trajectory in question exists for all time, so it is crucial to
determine whether the dynamics (ID) are well-posed. To that end, we will begin
with the inertial replicator dynamics (IRD) in the simple, baseline case X = [0, 1],
Φ = 0, which corresponds to a single player with two twin actions – say A = {0, 1}
with v0 = v1 = 0. Setting x = x1 = 1− x0 in (IRD), we then get the second-order
ODE:
x¨ =
1
2
x
(
x˙
/
x2 − x˙2/x− x˙2/(1− x)) = 1
2
1− 2x
x(1− x) x˙
2. (3.7)
To solve this equation, let ξ = 2
√
x and υ = ξ˙; after some algebra, we obtain the
separable equation
dυ
υ
= − ξ
4− ξ2 dξ, (3.8)
which, after integrating, further reduces to:
ξ˙ = υ =
υ0
4− ξ20
√
4− ξ2, (3.9)
with ξ0 = ξ(0) and υ0 = υ(0) = ξ˙(0). Some more algebra then yields the solution
ξ(t) = ξ0 cos
υ0t√
4− ξ20
+
√
4− ξ20 sin
υ0t√
4− ξ20
. (3.10)
From the above, we see that ξ(t) becomes negative in finite time for every interior
initial position ξ0 ∈ (0, 2) and for all υ0 ∈ R. However, since ξ(t) = 2
√
x(t) by
definition, this can only occur if x(t) exits (0, 1) in finite time; as a result, we
conclude that the inertial replicator dynamics (IRD) may fail to be well-posed,
even in the simple case of the zero game.
On the other hand, a similar calculation for the inertial log-barrier dynamics
(ILD) yields the equation:
x¨ = x˙2
(1− 2x)(1− x+ x2)
x(1− x)(1− 2x+ 2x2) , (3.11)
which, after the change of variables ξ = log x < 0 (recall that 0 < x < 1), becomes:
ξ¨ = −ξ˙2 e
2ξ
(1− eξ)(e2ξ + (1− eξ)2) . (3.12)
Setting υ = ξ˙ and separating as before, we then obtain the equation:
ξ˙ = C
1− eξ√
1− 2eξ + 2e2ξ , (3.13)
where C ∈ R is an integration constant. Contrary to (3.13), the RHS of (3.13) is
Lipschitz and bounded for ξ < 0 (and vanishes at ξ = 0), so the solution ξ(t) exists
for all time; as a result, we conclude that the simple system (3.11) is well-posed.
The fundamental difference between (3.7) and (3.11) is that the image of (0, 1)
under the change of variables x 7→ 2√x is a bounded set whereas the image of
the transformation x 7→ log x is the (unbounded) half-line ξ < 0: consequently,
the solutions of (3.9) escape from the image of (0, 1) in finite time, whereas the
solutions of (3.13) remain contained therein for all t ≥ 0. As we show below, this is
a special case of a more general geometric principle which characterizes those HR
structures that lead to well-posed dynamics.
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Our first step will be to construct a Euclidean equivalent of the dynamics (IRD)
by mapping X◦ isometrically in an ambient Euclidean space. To that end, let g
be a Riemannian metric on the open orthant C ≡ Rn+1++ of V ≡ Rn+1 and assume
there exists a sufficiently smooth strictly convex function ψ : C → R such that:14
g = Hess(ψ)2. (3.14)
Then, the derivative map G : C → V , x 7→ G(x) ≡ ∇ψ(x), is a) injective (as the
derivative of a strictly convex function); and b) an immersion (since Hess(ψ)  0).
Assume now that the target ambient space V is endowed with the Euclidean
metric δ(eα, eβ) = δαβ ; we then claim that G : (C, g)→ (V, δ) is an isometry, i.e.
g(eα, eβ) = δ(G∗eα, G∗eβ) for all α, β = 0, 1, . . . , n, (3.15)
where G∗eα denotes the push-forward of eα under G:
G∗eα =
n∑
γ=0
∂Gγ
∂xα
eγ =
n∑
γ=0
∂2ψ
∂xα∂xγ
eγ α = 0, 1, . . . , n. (3.16)
Indeed, substituting (3.16) in (3.15) yields:
δ(G∗eα, G∗eβ) =
n∑
γ,κ=0
∂2ψ
∂xα∂xγ
∂2ψ
∂xβ∂xκ
δ(eγ , eκ) =
n∑
γ=0
∂2ψ
∂xα∂xγ
∂2ψ
∂xβ∂xγ
= Hess(ψ)2αβ = gαβ , (3.17)
so we have established the following result:
Proposition 3.4. Let g be a Riemannian metric on the positive open orthant C
of V = Rn+1. If g = Hess(ψ)2 for some smooth function ψ : C → R, the derivative
map G = ∇ψ is an isometric injective immersion of (C, g) in (V, δ).
As it turns out, in the context of HR metrics generated by a kernel function θ,
G is actually an isometric embedding of (C, g) in (V, δ) and it can be calculated by
a simple, explicit recipe.15 To do so, let φ : (0,+∞)→ R be defined as:
φ′′(x) =
√
θ′′(x), (3.18)
and consider the coordinate transformation:
xα 7→ ξα = φ′(xα), α = 0, 1, . . . , n. (EC)
Letting ψ(x) =
∑n
α=0 φ(xα), it follows immediately that the derivative map G =
∇ψ of ψ is closed (i.e. it maps closed sets to closed sets), so the transformation
(EC) is a homeomorphism onto its image, and hence an isometric embedding of
(C, g) in (Rn+1, δ) by Proposition 3.4.
By this token, the variables ξα of (EC) will be referred to as Euclidean coordinates
for (C, g). In these coordinates, the image of X◦ is the n-dimensional hypersurface
S = G(X◦) =
{
ξ ∈ Rn+1 : ∑nα=0(φ′)−1(ξα) = 1}, (3.19)
so (ID) can be seen equivalently as a classical mechanical system evolving on S.
Specifically, (EC) yields ξ˙α = φ′′(xα)x˙α =
√
θ′′αx˙α and ξ¨α = θ′′′α
/
(2
√
θ′′α)x˙
2
α +
14We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this synthetic approach.
15Recall that an embedding is an injective immersion that is homeomorphic onto its image [22].
The existence of isometric embeddings is a consequence of the celebrated Nash–Kuiper embedding
theorem; however, Nash–Kuiper does not provide an explicit construction of such an embedding.
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θ′′αx¨α, so, after some algebra, we obtain the following expression for the inertial
dynamics (ID) in Euclidean coordinates:
ξ¨α =
1√
θ′′α
[
vα −
∑
β
(
Θ′′
/
θ′′β
)
vβ
]
+
1
2
1√
θ′′α
∑
β
Θ′′θ′′′β
/
(θ′′β)
2ξ˙2β − ηξ˙α. (ID-E)
In this way, (ID-E) represents a classical “heavy ball” moving on the hypersurface
S under the potential field Φ: the first term of (ID-E) is simply the projection of
the driving force F = grad Φ on S, the second term is the so-called “contact force”
which keeps the particle on S, and the third term of (ID-E) is simply the friction.
This reformulation of (ID) will play an important part in our well-posedness
analysis, so we discuss two representative examples:
Example 3.1. In the case of the Shahshahani metric (2.5), the transformation
(3.18) gives φ′′(x) =
√
θ′′(x) = 1/
√
x, so the Euclidean coordinates of the Shahsha-
hani metric are ξα = 2
√
xα and X◦ is isometric to the hypersurface:
S =
{
ξ ∈ Rn+1 : ξα > 0,
∑n
α=0 ξ
2
α = 4
}
, (3.20)
which is simply the (open) positive orthant of an n-dimensional sphere of radius
2.16 Hence, substituting in (ID-E), the Euclidean equivalent of the dynamics (IRD)
will be given by:
ξ¨α =
1
2
ξα
[
vα − 1
4
∑
β
ξ2βvβ
]
− 1
2
ξαK − ηξ˙α, (3.21)
where K = 12
∑
β ξ˙
2
β represents the system’s kinetic energy.
Example 3.2. In the case of the log-barrier metric (2.6), we have φ′′(x) = 1/x, so
the metric’s Euclidean coordinates are given by the transformation ξα = φ′(xα) =
log xα. Under this transformation, X◦ is mapped isometrically to the hypersurface
S =
{
ξ ∈ Rn+1 : ξα < 0,
∑
β e
ξβ = 1
}
, (3.22)
which is a closed (non-compact) hypersurface of Rn+1. In these transformed vari-
ables, the log-barrier dynamics (ILD) then become:
ξ¨α = e
ξα
[
vα − r−2
∑
β
e2ξβvβ
]
− r−2eξα
∑
β
eξβ ξ˙2β − ηξ˙α, (3.23)
where r2 =
∑
β x
2
β =
∑
β e
2ξβ .
The above examples highlight an important geometric difference between the
dynamics (IRD) and (ILD): (IRD) corresponds to a classical particle moving under
the influence of a finite force on an open portion of a sphere while (ILD) corresponds
to a classical particle moving under the influence of a finite force on the unbounded
hypersurface (3.22). As a result, physical intuition suggests that trajectories of
(IRD) escape in finite time while trajectories of (ILD) exist for all time (cf. Fig. 1).
The following theorem (proved in App. B) shows that this is indeed the case:
Theorem 3.5. Let g be a Hessian–Riemannian metric on the open orthant C =
Rn+1++ and let S be the image of X◦ under the Euclidean transformation (EC).
Then, the inertial dynamics (ID) are well-posed on X◦ if and only if S is a closed
hypersurface of Rn+1.
16This change of variables was first considered by Akin [1] and is sometimes referred to as
Akin’s transformation [40].
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(a) The inertial replicator dynamics (IRD). (b) Euclidean equivalent of (IRD).
(c) The inertial log-barrier dynamics (ILD). (d) Euclidean equivalent of (ILD).
Figure 1. Asymptotic behavior of the inertial dynamics (ID) and
their Euclidean presentation (ID-E) for the Shahshahani metric
gS (top) and the log-barrier metric gL (bottom) – cf. (2.5) and
(2.6) respectively. The surfaces to the right depict the isometric
image (3.19) of the simplex in Rn+1 and the contours represent the
level sets of the objective function Φ: R3 → R with Φ(x, y, z) =
1 − (x − 2/3)2 − (y − 1/3)2 − z2. As can be seen in Figs. (a)
and (b), the inertial replicator dynamics (IRD) collide with the
boundary bd(X) of X in finite time and thus fail to maximize Φ;
on the other hand, the solution orbits of (ILD) converge globally
to global maximum point of Φ.
From a more practical viewpoint, Theorem 3.5 allows us to verify that (ID) is
well-posed simply by checking that the Euclidean image S of X◦ is closed. More
precisely, we have:
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Corollary 3.6. The inertial dynamics (ID) are well-posed if and only if the kernel
θ of the HR structure of X satisfies
∫ 1
0
√
θ′′(x) dx = +∞.
Proof. Simply note that the image S = G(X◦) of X◦ under (EC) is bounded (and
hence, not closed) if and only if
∫ 1
0
φ′(x) dx =
∫ 1
0
√
θ′′(x) dx < +∞. 
In light of the above, we finally obtain:
Corollary 3.7. The inertial log-barrier dynamics (ILD) are well-posed.
4. Long-term optimization and rationality properties
In this section, we investigate the long-term optimization and rationality prop-
erties of the inertial dynamics (ID). Specifically, Section 4.1 focuses on the single-
agent framework of (ID) with v = ∇Φ for some smooth (but not necessarily con-
cave) objective function Φ: X → R; Section 4.2 then examines the convergence
properties of (ID) in the context of games in normal form (both symmetric and
asymmetric).
Since we are interested in the long-term convergence properties of (ID), we will
assume throughout this section that:
The solution orbits x(t) of the inertial dynamics (ID) exist for all time. (WP)
Thus, in what follows (and unless explicitly stated otherwise), we will be implicitly
assuming that the conditions of Theorem 3.5 and Corollary 3.6 hold; as such, the
analysis of this section applies to the inertial log-barrier dynamics (ILD) but not
to the inertial replicator system (IRD) which fails to be well-posed.
4.1. Convergence and stability properties in constrained optimization.
As before, let X ≡ ∆(n + 1) be the n-dimensional simplex of V ≡ Rn+1 and let
Φ: X → R be a smooth objective function on X. Proposition 3.1 shows that the
system’s energy is dissipated along (ID), so physical intuition suggests that interior
trajectories of (ID) are attracted to (local) maximizers of Φ. We begin by showing
that if an orbit spends an arbitrarily long amount of time in the vicinity of some
point x∗ ∈ X, then x∗ must be a critical point of Φ restricted to the subface X∗ of
X that is spanned by supp(x∗):
Proposition 4.1. Let x(t) be an interior solution of (ID) that is defined for all
t ≥ 0. Assume further that, for every δ > 0 and for every T > 0, there exists an
interval J of length at least T such that maxα{|xα(t)−x∗α|} < δ for all t ∈ J . Then:
∂αΦ(x
∗) = ∂βΦ(x∗) for all α, β ∈ supp(x∗). (4.1)
For the proof of this proposition, we will need the following preparatory lemma:
Lemma 4.2. Let ξ : [a, b]→ R be a smooth curve in R such that
ξ¨ + ηξ ≤ −m, (4.2)
for some η ≥ 0, m > 0 and for all t ∈ [a, b]. Then, for all t ∈ [a, b], we have:
ξ(t) ≤ ξ(a) +
η
−1
(
ξ˙(a) +mη−1
) (
1− e−η(t−a))−mη−1(t− a) if η > 0,
ξ˙(a)(t− a)− 12m(t− a)2 if η = 0.
(4.3)
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Proof. The case η = 0 is trivial to dispatch simply by integrating (4.2) twice. On
the other hand, for η > 0, if we multiply both sides of (4.2) with exp(ηt) and
integrate, we get:
ξ˙(t) ≤ ξ˙(a)e−η(t−a) −mη−1
(
1− e−η(t−a)
)
, (4.4)
and our assertion follows by integrating a second time. 
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Set vβ = ∂βΦ, β = 0, . . . , n, and let α be such that
vα(x
∗) ≤ vβ(x∗) for all β ∈ supp(x∗); assume further that vα(x∗) 6= vγ(x∗) for
some γ ∈ supp(x∗). We then have vα(x∗) −
∑
β∈supp(x∗) Θ
′′(x∗)/θ′′β(x
∗) · vβ(x∗) <
−m′ < 0 for some m′ > 0, and hence, by continuity, there exists some m > 0 such
that
θ′′α(x)
−1/2
(
vα(x)−
∑
β
(
Θ′′(x)
/
θ′′β(x)
)
vβ(x)
)
< m < 0 (4.5)
for all x ∈ Uδ ≡ {x : maxβ |xβ−x∗β | < δ} and for all sufficiently small δ > 0 (simply
recall that limx→0+ θ′′(x) = +∞ and that θ′′α(x∗) > 0).
That being so, fix δ > 0 as above, and let M > 0 be such that xα − x∗α < −δ
whenever the Euclidean coordinates ξα of (EC) satisfy ξα < −M . Choose also some
sufficiently large T > 0; then, by assumption, there exists an interval J = [a, b] with
length b − a ≥ T and such that x(t) ∈ Uδ for all t ∈ J . Since limt→∞ x˙α(t) = 0
by Proposition 3.2, we may also assume that the interval J = [a, b] is such that
ξ˙α(a) is itself sufficiently small (simply note that if xα is bounded away from 0,
ξ˙α = φ
′′(xα)x˙α cannot become arbitrarily large).
In this manner, the Euclidean presentation (ID-E) of (ID) yields
ξ¨α ≤ −m+ 1
2
1√
θ′′α
∑
β
Θ′′θ′′′β
/
(θ′′β)
2ξ˙2β − ηξ˙α < −m− ηξ˙α for all t ∈ J, (4.6)
where the second inequality follows from the regularity assumption θ′′′(x) < 0.
However, with T large enough and ξ˙α(a) small enough, Lemma 4.2 shows that
ξα(t) < −M for large enough t ∈ J , implying that x(t) 6= Uδ, a contradiction. We
thus conclude that vα(x∗) = vγ(x∗) for all α, γ ∈ supp(x∗), as claimed. 
Proposition 4.1 shows that if x(t) converges to x∗ ∈ X, then x∗ must be a
restricted critical point of Φ in the sense of (4.1). More generally, the following
lemma establishes that any ω-limit of (ID) has this property:
Lemma 4.3. Let xω be an ω-limit of (ID) for η > 0, and let U be a neighborhood
of xω in X. Then, for every T > 0, there exists an interval J of length at least T
such that x(t) ∈ U for all t ∈ J .
Proof. Fix a neighborhood U of xω in X, and let Uδ = {x : maxβ |xβ − x∗β | < δ}
be a δ-neighborhood of xω such that Uδ ∩ X ⊆ U . By assumption, there exists
an increasing sequence of times tn → ∞ such that x(tn) → xω, so we can take
x(tn) ∈ Uδ/2 for all n. Moreover, let t′n = inf{t : t ≥ tn and x(t) /∈ Uδ} be the first
exit time of x(t) from Uδ after tn, and assume ad absurdum that t′n − tn < M for
some M > 0 and for all n. Then, by descending to a subsequence of tn if necessary,
we will have |xα(t′n)− xα(tn)| > δ/2 for some α and for all n. Hence, by the mean
value theorem, there exists τn ∈ (tn, t′n) such that
|x˙α(τn)| = |xα(t
′
n)− xα(tn)|
t′n − tn
>
δ
2M
for all n, (4.7)
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implying in particular that lim sup |x˙α(t)| > δ/(2M) > 0 in contradiction to Propo-
sition 3.2. We thus conclude that the difference t′n− tn is unbounded, i.e. for every
δ > 0 and for every T > 0, there exists an interval J of length at least T such that
x(t) ∈ Uδ for all t ∈ J . 
Even though the above properties of (ID) are interesting in themselves (cf. The-
orem 4.6 for a game-theoretic interpretation), for now they will mostly serve as
stepping stones to the following asymptotic convergence result:
Theorem 4.4. With notation as above, let x∗ ∈ X be a local maximizer of Φ such
that (x − x∗)> · Hess(Φ(x∗)) · (x − x∗) > 0 for all x ∈ X with supp(x) ⊆ supp(x∗)
– i.e. Hess(Φ(x∗)) is positive-definite when restricted to the subface of X that is
spanned by x∗. If η > 0, then, for every interior solution x(t) of (ID) that starts
close enough to x∗ and with sufficiently speed ‖x˙(0)‖, we have limt→∞ x(t) = x∗.
Proof. Let xω be an ω-limit of x(t). By Lemma 4.3, x(t) will be spending arbi-
trarily long time intervals near xω, so Proposition 4.1 shows that xω satisfies the
stationarity condition (4.1), viz. ∂αΦ(xω) = ∂βΦ(xω) = v∗ for all α, β ∈ supp(xω).
We will proceed to show that the theorem’s assumptions imply that x∗ is the
unique ω-limit of x(t), i.e. limt→∞ x(t) = x∗. To that end, assume that x(t) starts
close enough to x∗ and with sufficiently low energy. Then, Proposition 3.1 shows
that every ω-limit of x(t) must also lie close enough to x∗ (simply note that Φ(x(t))
can never exceed the initial energy E(0) of x(t)); as a result, the support of any
ω-limit of x(t) will contain that of x∗. However, by the theorem’s assumptions, the
restriction of Φ to the face of X spanned by x∗ is strongly concave near x∗, and
since xω itself lies close enough to x∗, we get:∑n
β=0
∂βΦ(x
ω) · (xωβ − x∗β) ≤ Φ(xω)− Φ(x∗) ≤ 0, (4.8)
with equality if and only if xω = x∗. On the other hand, with supp(x∗) ⊆ supp(xω),
we also get:
n∑
β=0
∂βΦ(x
ω) · (x∗β − xωβ ) =
∑
β∈supp(xω)
∂βΦ(x
ω) · (x∗β − xωβ )
= v∗
∑
β∈supp(xω)
(x∗β − xωβ ) = 0, (4.9)
so xω = x∗, as claimed. 
Remark 4.1. Since the total energy E(t) of the system is decreasing, Theorem
4.4 implies that x(t) stays close and converges to x∗ whenever it starts close to x∗
with low energy. This formulation is almost equivalent to x∗ being asymptotically
stable in (ID); in fact, if x∗ is interior, the two statements are indeed equivalent.
For x∗ ∈ bd(X), asymptotic stability is a rather cumbersome notion because the
structure of the phase space of the dynamics (ID) changes at every subface of X;
in view of this, we opted to stay with the simpler formulation of Theorem 4.4 – for
a related discussion, see [20, Sec. 5].
Remark 4.2. We should also note here that the non-degeneracy requirement of
Theorem 4.4 can be relaxed: for instance, the same proof applies if there is no x′
near x∗ such that ∂αΦ(x′) = ∂βΦ(x′) for all α, β ∈ supp(x′). More generally, if X∗
is a convex set of local maximizers of Φ and (4.8) holds in a neighborhood of X∗
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with equality if and only if xω ∈ X∗, a similar (but more cumbersome) reasoning
shows that x(t)→ X∗, i.e. X∗ is locally attracting.
Remark 4.3. Theorem 4.4 is a local convergence result and does not exploit global
properties of the objective function (such as concavity) in order to establish global
convergence results. Even though physical intuition suggests that this should be
easily possible, the mathematical analysis is quite convoluted due to the boundary
behavior of the covariant correction term of (ID) (the second term of (ID-E) which
acts as a contact force that constrains the trajectories of (ID-E) to S).
The main difficulty is that a Lyapunov-type argument relying on the minimiza-
tion of the system’s total energy E = K−Φ does not suffice to exclude convergence
to a point xω ∈ X that is a local maximizer of Φ on the subface of X that is
spanned by supp(xω). In the first-order case, this phenomenon is ruled out by us-
ing the Bregman divergence Dh(x∗, x) = h(x∗) − h(x) − h′(x;x∗ − x) as a global
Lyapunov function; in our context however, the obvious candidate Eh = K + Dh
does not satisfy a dissipation principle because of the curvature of X under the HR
metric induced by h.
4.2. Convergence and stability properties in games. We now return to game
theory and examine the convergence and stability properties of (ID) with respect to
Nash equilibria. To that end, recall first that a strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗N ) ∈
X is called a Nash equilibrium if it is stable against unilateral deviations, i.e.
uk(x
∗) ≥ uk(xk;x∗−k) for all xk ∈ Xk and for all k ∈ N, (4.10)
or, equivalently:
vkα(x
∗) ≥ vkβ(x∗) for all α ∈ supp(x∗k) and for all β ∈ Ak, k ∈ N. (4.11)
If (4.10) is strict for all xk 6= x∗k, k ∈ N, we say that x∗ a strict equilibrium; finally,
if (4.10) holds for all xk ∈ Xk such that supp(xk) ⊆ supp(x∗k), we say that x∗ is a
restricted equilibrium [40].
Our first result concerns potential games, viewed here simply as a class of (non-
convex) optimization problems defined over products of simplices:
Proposition 4.5. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a potential game with potential function
Φ, and let x∗ be an isolated maximizer of Φ (and, hence, a strict equilibrium of G).
If η > 0 and x(t) is an interior solution of (ID) that starts close enough to x∗ with
sufficiently low initial speed ‖x˙(0)‖, then x(t) stays close to x∗ for all t ≥ 0 and
limt→∞ x(t) = x∗.
Proof. In the presence of a potential function Φ as in (1.6), the dynamics (ID)
become D2x/Dt2 = grad Φ − ηx˙ for x ∈ X ≡ ∏k ∆(Ak), so our claim essentially
follows as in Theorem 4.4: Propositions 3.2 and 4.1 extend trivially to the case
where X is a product of simplices, and, by multilinearity of the game’s potential, it
follows that there are no other stationary points of (ID) near a strict equilibrium of
G (cf. Remark 4.2). As a result, any trajectory of (ID) which starts close to a strict
equilibrium x∗ of G and always remains in its vicinity will eventually converge to
x∗; since trajectories which start near x∗ with sufficiently low kinetic energy K(0)
have this property, our claim follows. 
On the other hand, Proposition 4.5 does not say much for general, non-potential
games.
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More generally, if the game does not admit a potential function, the most well-
known stability and convergence result is the so-called “folk theorem” of evolution-
ary game theory [18, 19] which states that, under the replicator dynamics (RD):
I. A state is stationary if and only if it is a restricted equilibrium.
II. If an interior solution orbit converges, its limit is Nash.
III. If a point is Lyapunov stable, then it is also Nash.
IV. A point is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict equilibrium.
In the context of the inertial game dynamics (ID), we have:
Theorem 4.6. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game, let x(t) be a solution orbit of
(ID) that exists for all time, and let x∗ ∈ X. Then:
I. x(t) = x∗ for all t ≥ 0 if and only if x∗ is a restricted equilibrium of G (i.e.
vkα(x
∗) = max{vkβ(x∗) : x∗kβ > 0} whenever x∗kα > 0).
II. If x(0) ∈ X◦ and limt→∞ x(t) = x∗, then x∗ is a restricted equilibrium of G.
III. If every neighborhood U of x∗ in X admits an interior orbit xU (t) such that
xU (t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0, then x∗ is a restricted equilibrium of G.
IV. If x∗ is a strict equilibrium of G and x(t) starts close enough to x∗ with
sufficiently low speed ‖x˙(0)‖, then x(t) remains close to x∗ for all t ≥ 0 and
limt→∞ x(t) = x∗.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. We begin with the stationarity of restricted Nash equilibria.
Clearly, extending the dynamics (ID) to bd(X) in the obvious way, it suffices to
consider interior stationary equilibria. Accordingly, if x∗ ∈ X◦ is Nash, we will have
vkα(x
∗) = vkβ(x∗) for all α, β ∈ Ak, and hence also vkα(x∗) =
∑k
β(Θ
′′
k/θ
′′
kβ)vkβ(x
∗)
for all α ∈ Ak. Furthermore, with θ′′α(x∗) > 0, the velocity-dependent terms of (ID)
will also vanish if x˙kα(0) = 0 for all α ∈ Ak, so the initial conditions x(0) = x∗,
x˙(0) = 0, imply that x(t) = x∗ for all t ≥ 0. Conversely, if x(t) = x∗ for all time,
then we also have x˙(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, and hence vkα(x∗) =
∑k
β(Θ
′′
k/θ
′′
kβ)vkβ(x
∗)
for all α ∈ Ak, i.e. x∗ is an equilibrium of G.
For Part II of the theorem, note that if an interior trajectory x(t) converges to
x∗ ∈ X, then every neighborhood U of x∗ in X admits an interior orbit xU (t) such
that xU (t) stays in U for all t ≥ 0, so the claim of Part II is subsumed in that
of Part III. To that end, assume ad absurdum that x∗ has the property described
above without being a restricted equilibrium, i.e. there exists α ∈ supp(x∗k) with
vkα(x
∗) < maxβ{vkβ(x∗)}. As in the proof of Proposition 4.1,17 let U be a small
enough neighborhood of x∗ in X such that
θ′′kα(x)
−1/2
[
vkα(x)−
∑k
β
(
Θ′′k(x)
/
θ′′kβ(x)
)
vkβ(x)
]
< m < 0 (4.12)
for all x ∈ U . Then, with x(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0, the Euclidean presentation (ID-E)
of the inertial dynamics (ID) readily gives
ξ¨kα ≤ −m+ 1
2
1√
θ′′kα
∑k
β
Θ′′kθ
′′′
kβ
/
(θ′′kβ)
2ξ˙2kβ − ηξ˙kα < −m− ηξ˙kα for all t ≥ 0,
(4.13)
so, by Lemma 4.2, we obtain ξkα(t)→ −∞ as t→∞. However, the definition (EC)
of the Euclidean coordinates ξkα shows that xkα(t)→ 0 if ξkα(t)→ −∞, and since
17Note here that Proposition 4.1 does not apply directly because the dynamics (ID) need not
be conservative.
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x∗kα > 0 by assumption, we obtain a contradiction which establishes our original
claim.
Finally, for Part IV of the theorem, let x∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α∗N ) be a strict equilibrium
of G (recall that only vertices of X can be strict equilibria). We will show that
if x(t) starts at rest (x˙(0) = 0) and with initial Euclidean coordinates ξkµ(0),
µ ∈ A∗k ≡ Ak \{α∗k} that are sufficiently close to their lowest possible value ξk,0 ≡
inf{φ′k(x) : x > 0},18 then x(t) → q as t → ∞. Our proof remains essentially
unchanged (albeit more tedious to write down) if the (Euclidean) norm of the
initial velocity ξ˙(0) of the trajectory is bounded by some sufficiently small constant
δ > 0, so the theorem follows by recalling that ‖x˙(0)‖ = ‖ξ˙(0)‖.
Indeed, let U be a neighborhood of x∗ in X such that (4.12) holds for all x ∈ U
and for all µ ∈ A∗k ≡ Ak \{α∗k} substituted in place of α. Moreover, let U ′ = G(U)
be the image of U under the Euclidean embedding ξ = G(x) of Eq. (EC), and let
τU = inf{t : x(t) /∈ U} = inf{t : ξ(t) /∈ U ′} be the first escape time of ξ(t) = G(x(t))
from U ′. Assuming τU < +∞ (recall that ξ(t) is assumed to exist for all t ≥ 0),
we have xkµ(τU ) ≥ xkµ(0) and hence ξkµ(τU ) ≥ ξkµ(0) for some k ∈ N, µ ∈ A∗k;
consequently, there exists some τ ′ ∈ (0, τ ′U ) such that ξ˙kµ(τ ′) ≥ 0. By the definition
of U , we also have ξ¨kµ + ηξ˙kµ < −m < 0 for all t ∈ (0, τU ), so, with ξ˙(0) = 0, the
bound (4.4) in the proof of Lemma 4.2 readily yields ξ˙kµ(τ ′) < 0, a contradiction.19
We thus conclude that τU = +∞, so we also get ξ¨kµ + ηξ˙kµ < −m < 0 for all
k ∈ N, µ ∈ A∗k, and for all t ≥ 0. Lemma 4.2 then gives limt→∞ ξkµ(t) = −∞, i.e.
x(t)→ x∗, as claimed. 
Theorem 4.6 is our main rationality result for asymmetric (multi-population)
games, so some remarks are in order:
Remark 4.4. Performing a point-to-point comparison between the first-order “folk
theorem” of [18, 19] for (RD) and Theorem 4.6 for (ID), we may note the following:
Part I of Theorem 4.6 is tantamount to the corresponding first-order statement.
Part II differs from the first-order case in that it allows convergence to non-Nash
stationary profiles. For η = 0, the reason for this behavior is that if a trajectory x(t)
starts close to a restricted equilibrium x∗ with an initial velocity pointing towards
x∗, then x(t) may escape towards x∗ if there is only a vanishingly small force pushing
x(t) away from x∗. We have not been able to find such a counterexample for η > 0
and we conjecture that even a small amount of friction prohibits convergence to
non-Nash profiles.
Part III only posits the existence of a single interior trajectory that stays close
to x∗, so it is a less stringent requirement than Lyapunov stability; on the other
hand, and for the same reasons as before, this condition does not suffice to exclude
non-Nash stationary points of (ID).
Part IV is not exactly the same as the corresponding first-order statement be-
cause the notion of asymptotic stability is quite cumbersome in a second-order set-
ting. Theorem 4.6 shows instead that if x(t) starts close to x∗ and with sufficiently
18By the definition of the Euclidean coordinates ξkα = φ′k(xkα), this condition is equivalent
to x(t) starting at a small enough neighborhood of x∗.
19One simply needs to consider the escape time τ˜ from a larger neighborhood U˜ of q chosen so
that if |ξ˙kµ(0)| < δ for some sufficiently small δ > 0, then the bound (??) guarantees the existence
of a non-positive rate of change ξ˙kµ(τ0) for some τ0 < τ˜ .
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low speed ‖x˙(0)‖ (or, equivalently, sufficiently low kinetic energyK(0) = 12 ‖x˙(0)‖2),
then x(t) remains close to x∗ and limt→∞ x(t) = x∗. This result continues to hold
when restricting (ID) to any subface X′ of X containing x∗, so this can be seen as
a form of asymptotic stability for x∗.20
Remark 4.5. Finally, we note that Theorem 4.6 does not require a positive friction
coefficient η > 0, in stark contrast to the convergence result of Theorem 4.4. The
reason for this is that convergence to strict equilibria corresponds to the Euclidean
trajectories of (ID-E) escaping towards infinity, so friction is not required to ensure
convergence. As such, Part IV of Theorem 4.6 also extends Proposition 4.5 to the
frictionless case η = 0.
We close this section with a brief discussion of the rationality properties of (ID)
in the class of symmetric (single-population) games, i.e. 2-player games where
A1 = A2 = A for some finite set A and x1 = x2 [18, 40, 49].21 In this case,
a fundamental equilibrium refinement due to Maynard Smith and Price [24, 25]
is the notion of an evolutionarily stable state (ESS), i.e. a state that cannot be
invaded by a small population of mutants; formally, we say that x∗ ∈ X ≡ ∆(A) is
evolutionarily stable if there exists a neighborhood U of x∗ in X such that:
u(x∗, x∗) ≥ u(x, x∗) for all x ∈ X, (4.14a)
u(x∗, x∗) = u(x, x∗) implies that u(x∗, x) > u(x, x), (4.14b)
where u(x, y) = x>Uy is the game’s payoff function and U = (Uαβ)α,β∈A is the
game’s payoff matrix.22 We then have:
Proposition 4.7. With notation as above, let x∗ be an ESS of a symmetric game
with symmetric payoff matrix. Then, provided that η > 0, x∗ attracts all interior
trajectories of (ID) that start near x∗ and with sufficiently low speed ‖x˙(0)‖.
Proof. Following [45], recall that x∗ is an ESS if and only if there exists a neigh-
borhood U of x∗ in X such that
〈v(x)|x− x∗〉 < 0 for all x ∈ U \{x∗}, (4.15)
where vα(x) = u(α, x) denotes the average payoff of the α-th strategy in x ∈ X.
Since the game’s payoff matrix is symmetric, we will also have v(x) = 12∇u(x, x), so
x∗ is a local maximizer of u; as a result, the conditions of Theorem 4.4 are satisfied
and our claim follows. 
5. Discussion
To summarize, the class of inertial game dynamics considered in this paper ex-
hibits some unexpected properties. First and foremost, in the case of the replicator
dynamics, the inertial system (IRD) does not coincide with the second-order repli-
cator dynamics of exponential learning (RD2); in fact, the dynamics (IRD) are not
even well-posed, so the rationality properties of (RD2) do not hold in that case.
20This could be formalized by considering the phase space obtained by joining the phase space
of (ID) with that of every possible restriction of (ID) to a subface X′ of X, but this is a rather
tedious formulation (see also the relevant remark following Theorem 4.4).
21In the “mass-action” interpretation of evolutionary game theory, this class of games simply
corresponds to intra-species interactions in a single-species population [49].
22Intuitively, (4.14a) implies that x∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game while (4.14b)
means that x∗ performs better against any alternative best reply x than x performs against itself.
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On the other hand, by considering a different geometry on the simplex, we obtain
a well-posed class of game dynamics with several local convergence and stability
properties, some of which do not hold for (RD2) (such as the asymptotic stability
of ESSs in symmetric, single-population games).
Having said that, we still have several open questions concerning the dynamics’
global properties. From an optimization viewpoint, the main question that remains
is whether the dynamics converge globally to a maximum point in the case of
concave functions; in a game-theoretic framework, the main issue is the elimination
of stricly dominated strategies (which is true in both (RD) and (RD2)) and, more
interestingly, that of weakly dominated strategies (which holds under (RD2) but not
under (RD)). A positive answer to these questions (which we expect is the case)
would imply that the class of inertial game dynamics combines the advantages of
both first- and second-order learning schemes in games, thus collecting a wide array
of long-term rationality properties under the same umbrella.
Appendix A. Elements of Riemannian geometry
In this section, we give a brief overview of the geometric notions used in the
main part of the paper following the masterful account of [21].
Let W = Rn+1 and let W ∗ be its dual. A scalar product on W is a bilinear
pairing 〈·, ·〉 : W ×W → R such that for all w, z ∈W :
(1) 〈w, z〉 = 〈z, w〉 (symmetry).
(2) 〈w,w〉 ≥ 0 with equality if and only if w = 0 (positive-definiteness).
By linearity, if {eα}nα=0 is a basis for W and w =
∑n
α=0 wαeα, z =
∑n
β=0 zβeβ , we
have
〈w, z〉 =
n∑
α,β=0
gαβwαzβ , (A.1)
where the so-called metric tensor gαβ of the scalar product 〈·, ·〉 is defined as
gαβ = 〈eα, eβ〉. (A.2)
Likewise, the norm of w ∈W is defined as
‖w‖ = 〈w,w〉1/2 =
(∑d
α,β=0 gαβwαwβ
)1/2
. (A.3)
Now, if U is an open set in W and x ∈ U , the tangent space to U at x is simply
the (pointed) vector space TxU ≡ {(x,w) : w ∈ W} ∼= W of tangent vectors at
x; dually, the cotangent space to U at x is the dual space T ∗xU ≡ (TxU)∗ ∼= W ∗
of all linear forms on TxU (also known as cotangent vectors). Fibering the above
constructions over U , a vector field (resp. differential form) is then a smooth
assignment x 7→ w(x) ∈ TxU (resp. x 7→ ω(x) ∈ T ∗xU), and the space of vector
fields (resp. differential forms) on U will be denoted by T(U) (resp. T∗(U)).
Given all this, a Riemannian metric on U is a smooth assignment of a scalar
product to each tangent space TxU , i.e. a smooth field of (symmetric) positive-
definite metric tensors gαβ(x) prescribing a scalar product between tangent vectors
at each x ∈ U . Furthermore, if f : U → R is a smooth function on U , the differential
of f at x is defined as the (unique) differential form df(x) ∈ T ∗xU such that
d
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
f(γ(t)) = 〈df(x)|γ˙(0)〉 (A.4)
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for every smooth curve γ : (−ε, ε)→ U with γ(0) = x. Dually, given a Riemannian
metric on U , the gradient of f at x is then defined as the (unique) vector grad f(x) ∈
TxU such that
d
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
f(γ(t)) = 〈grad f(x), γ˙(0)〉 (A.5)
for all smooth curves γ(t) as above.
Combining (A.4) and (A.5), we see that df(x) and grad f(x) satisfy the funda-
mental duality relation:
〈df(x)|w〉 = 〈grad f(x), w〉 for all w ∈ TxU . (A.6)
Hence, by writing everything out in coordinates and rearranging, we obtain
(grad f(x))α =
n∑
β=0
gαβ(x)
∂f
∂xβ
, (A.7)
where
gαβ(x) = g−1αβ (x) (A.8)
denotes the inverse matrix of the metric tensor gαβ(x). For simplicity, we will often
write this equation as grad f = g−1∇f where ∇f = (∂αf)nα=0 denotes the array of
partial derivatives of f .
In view of the above, differentiating a function f ∈ C∞(U) along a vector field
w ∈ T(U) simply amounts to taking the directional derivative w(f) ≡ 〈df |w〉 =
〈grad f, w〉. On the other hand, to differentiate a vector field along another, we will
need the notion of a (linear) connection on U , viz. a map
∇ : T(U)× T(U)→ T(U) (A.9)
written (w, z) 7→ ∇wz, and such that:
(1) ∇f1w1+f2w2z = f1∇w1z + f2∇w2z for all f1, f2 ∈ C∞(U).
(2) ∇w(az1 + bz2) = a∇wz1 + b∇wz2 for all a, b ∈ R.
(3) ∇w(fz) = f ·∇wz+∇wf ·z for all f ∈ C∞(U), where∇wf ≡ w(f) = 〈df |w〉.
In this way, ∇wz generalizes the idea of differentiating z along w and it will be
called the covariant derivative of z in the direction of w.
In the standard frame {eα}nα=0 of TU , the defining properties of ∇ give
∇wz =
n∑
α,β=0
wα
∂zβ
∂xα
eβ +
n∑
α,β,κ=0
Γκαβwαzβeκ, (A.11)
where the Christoffel symbols Γκαβ ∈ C∞(U) of ∇ in the frame {eα} are defined via
the equation
∇eαeβ =
n∑
κ=0
Γκαβeκ. (A.12)
Clearly, ∇ is completely specified by its Christoffel symbols, so there is no canon-
ical connection on U ; however, if U is also endowed with a Riemannian metric g,
then there exists a unique connection which is symmetric (i.e. Γκαβ = Γ
κ
βα) and
compatible with g in the sense that:
∇w 〈z1, z2〉 = 〈∇wz1, z2〉+ 〈z1,∇wz2〉 for all w, z1, z2 ∈ T(U). (A.13)
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This connection is known as the Levi-Civita connection on U , and its Christoffel
symbols are given in coordinates by
Γκαβ =
1
2
n∑
ρ=0
gκρ
(
∂gρβ
∂xα
+
∂gρα
∂xβ
− ∂gαβ
∂xρ
)
. (A.14)
In view of the above, the covariant derivative of a vector field w ∈ T(U) along a
curve γ(t) on U is defined as:
Dw
Dt
≡ ∇γ˙w ≡
n∑
α,β,κ=0
(
w˙κ + Γ
κ
αβwαγ˙β
)
eκ. (A.15)
Thus, specializing to the case where w(t) is simply the velocity υ(t) = γ˙(t) of γ,
the acceleration of γ is defined as D
2γ
Dt2 =
Dυ
Dt = ∇γ˙ γ˙ or, in components:
D2γκ
Dt2
≡ γ¨κ +
n∑
α,β=0
Γκαβ γ˙αγ˙β . (A.16)
The kinetic energy of a curve γ(t) is defined simply as K = 12 ‖γ˙‖2; in view of
the metric compatibility condition (A.13), it is then easy to show that
K˙ =
〈
D2γ
Dt2
, γ˙
〉
, (A.17)
so a curve moves at constant speed (K˙ = 0) if and only if it satisfies the geodesic
equation D
2γ
Dt2 = 0. On that account, the definition (A.16) of a curve’s covariant
acceleration is simply a consequence of the fundamental requirement that “curves
with zero acceleration move at constant speed” (by contrast, note that γ¨ = 0
does not necessarily imply K˙ = 0, so γ¨ cannot act as a covariant measure of
acceleration).
Appendix B. Calculations and proofs
In this section, we provide some calculations and proofs that would have other-
wise disrupted the flow of the paper.
B.1. Calculation of the Christoffel symbols. We begin with a matrix inversion
formula that is required for our geometric calculations:
Lemma B.1. Let Aµν = qµδµν + q0 for some q0, q1, . . . , qn > 0. Then, the inverse
matrix Aµν of Aµν is
Aµν =
δµν
qµ
− Q
qµqν
, (B.1)
where Q denotes the harmonic aggregate Q−1 ≡∑nα=0 q−1α .
Proof. By a straightforward verification, we have:
n∑
ν=1
AµνA
νρ =
∑n
ν=1
(qµδµν + q0)(δνρ/qν −Q/(qνqρ))
=
n∑
ν=1
(qµδµνδνρ/qν + q0δνρ/qν − qµQδµν/(qνqρ)− q0Q/(qνqρ))
= δµρ + q0q
−1
ρ −Qq−1ρ − q0Qq−1ρ
∑
ν q
−1
ν = δµρ, (B.2)
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as claimed. 
With this inversion formula at hand, the inverse matrix g˜µν of the metric tensor
g˜µν of g in the coordinates (2.8) will be given by (2.12), viz. g˜µν =
[
δµν−Θ′′/θ′′ν
]
/θ′′µ.
Thus, the Christoffel symbols Γ˜κµν of g˜ in the same coordinate chart can be calcu-
lated by the expression Γ˜κµν =
∑
ρ g˜
κρΓ˜ρµν where, in view of (A.14), the Christoffel
symbols of the first kind Γ˜ρµν are defined as:
Γ˜ρµν =
1
2
(
∂g˜ρµ
∂wν
+
∂g˜ρν
∂wµ
− ∂g˜µν
∂wρ
)
. (B.3)
Note now that (2.10) implies that g˜µν = ∂
2h˜
∂xµ∂xν
where h˜ = h ◦ ι0 : U → R is the
pull-back of h to U via ι0. By the equality of mixed partials, we then obtain:
Γ˜ρµν =
1
2
∂3h˜
∂wρ∂wµ∂wν
=
1
2
(
θ′′′ρ δρµν − θ′′′0
)
, (B.4)
where δρµν = δρµδµν denotes the triagonal Kronecker symbol (δρµν = 1 if ρ =
µ = ν and 0 otherwise) and θ′′′β , β = 0, 1, . . . , n, is shorthand for θ
′′′
β (x) = θ
′′′(xβ).
Accordingly, combining (B.4) and (2.12), we finally obtain:
Γ˜κµν =
n∑
ρ=1
g˜κρΓ˜ρµν =
1
2
∑
ρ
(
δκρ
θ′′ρ
− Θ
′′
θ′′ρθ′′k
)
(θ′′′ρ δρµν − θ′′′0 )
=
1
2
[
δκµν
θ′′′κ
θ′′κ
− Θ
′′θ′′′µ
θ′′κθ′′µ
δµν − θ
′′′
0
θ′′κ
+
Θ′′θ′′′0
θ′′κ
(
1
Θ′′
− 1
θ′′0
)]
=
1
2
[
δκµν
θ′′′κ
θ′′κ
− Θ
′′θ′′′µ
θ′′κθ′′µ
δµν − θ
′′′
0 Θ
′′
θ′′0θ′′κ
]
, (B.5)
where we used the fact that
∑n
ρ=1 1/θ
′′
ρ = 1/Θ
′′ − 1/θ′′0 in the second line. Conse-
quently, we obtain the following expression for the covariant acceleration (A.16) of
a curve x(t) on U :
D2xκ
Dt2
= x¨κ +
1
2
n∑
µ,ν=1
[
δκµν
θ′′′κ
θ′′κ
− Θ
′′θ′′′µ
θ′′κθ′′µ
δµν − θ
′′′
0 Θ
′′
θ′′0θ′′κ
]
x˙µx˙ν
= x¨κ +
1
2
θ′′′κ
θ′′κ
x˙2κ −
1
2
Θ′′
θ′′κ
 n∑
ν=1
θ′′′ν
θ′′ν
x˙2ν +
θ′′′0
θ′′0
(
n∑
ν=1
x˙ν
)2 , (B.6)
which is simply (2.18).
B.2. The well-posedness dichotomy. In this section, we prove our geometric
characterization for the well-posedness of (ID):
Proof of Theorem 3.5. As indicated by our discussion on the inertial systems (IRD)
and (ILD), we will prove Theorem 3.5 for the equivalent Euclidean dynamics (ID-E);
also, we will only tackle the frictionless case η = 0, the case η > 0 being entirely
similar. Finally, for notational convenience, the Euclidean inner product will be
denoted in what follows by w · z and the corresponding norm by |·|.
On account of the above, let ξ(t) be a local solution orbit of (ID-E) with initial
conditions ξ(0) ≡ ξ0 ∈ S and ξ˙(0) = ξ˙0 ∈ Tξ0S; existence and uniqueness of ξ(t)
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follow from the classical Picard–Lindelöf theorem, so assume ad absurdum that ξ(t)
only exists up to some maximal time T > 0. Accordingly, let
Fα =
1√
θ′′α
(
vα −
∑
β
(
Θ′′
/
θ′′β
)
vβ
)
, (B.7a)
and
Nα =
Θ′′
2
√
θ′′α
∑
β
θ′′′β
/
(θ′′β)
2ξ˙2β , (B.7b)
denote the tangential and contact force terms of (ID-E) respectively. Since F is a
weighted difference of bounded quantities, we will have |F (ξ(t))| ≤ Fmax for some
Fmax > 0; furthermore, it is easy to verify that N is indeed normal to S, so, for all
t < T , the work of the resultant force F +N along ξ(t) will be:
W (t) =
∫
ξ
(F +N) =
∫ t
0
F (ξ(s)) · ξ˙(s) ds ≤ Fmax
∫ t
0
|ξ˙(s)| ds ≤ Fmax · `(t), (B.8)
where `(t) =
∫ t
0
|ξ˙(s)| ds is the (Euclidean) length of ξ up to time t.
On the other hand, with F +N = ξ¨, we will also have
W (t) =
∫ t
0
ξ¨(s) · ξ˙(s) ds = 12υ2(t)− 12υ20 , (B.9)
where υ(t) = |ξ˙(t)| = ˙`(t) is the speed of the trajectory at time t and υ0 ≡ |ξ˙0|.
Combining with (B.8), we thus get the differential inequality
υ(t) = ˙`(t) ≤
√
υ20 + 2Fmax `(t), (B.10)
which, after separating variables and integrating, gives:√
υ20 + 2Fmax `(t)− υ0 ≤ Fmax t. (B.11)
It thus follows that the speed υ(t) of the trajectory is bounded by |ξ˙(t)| = υ(t) ≤
υ0t + Fmaxt; similarly, for the total distance travelled by ξ(t), we get `(t) ≤ υ0t +
1
2Fmaxt
2, so |ξ| and |ξ˙| are both bounded by some `max and υmax respectively for
all t ≤ T .
As a result, for any s, t ∈ [0, T ) with s < t, we will also have
|ξ(t)− ξ(s)| ≤
∫ t
s
|ξ˙(τ)| dτ ≤ υmax(t− s), (B.12)
so, if tn → T is Cauchy, the same will for ξ(tn) as well; hence, with S closed, we
will also have limt→T ξ(t) ≡ ξT ∈ S. With ξ˙ bounded, we then get
|ξ˙(t)− ξ˙(s)| ≤
∫ t
s
|ξ¨(τ)| dτ ≤ Fmax(t− s) +
∑
β
∫ t
s
|Nβ(ξ(τ), ξ˙(τ))| dτ, (B.13)
and with sup |ξ| , sup|ξ˙| < ∞, it follows that the components |Nβ | of the contact
force are also bounded: x(t) = G−1(ξ(t)) remains a positive distance away from
bd(X) for all t ≤ T , so the weight coefficients θ′′′β /(θ′′β)2 of the centripetal force N
in (B.7b) are bounded, and the same holds for the velocity components ξ˙2β . We will
thus have |ξ˙(t)− ξ˙(s)| ≤ a(t− s) for some a > 0, so the limit limt→T ξ˙(t) exists and
is finite. In this way, if we take (ID-E) with initial conditions ξ(T ) = ξT and ξ˙(T ) =
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limt→T ξ˙(t), the Picard–Lindelöf theorem shows that the original maximal solution
ξ(t) may be extended beyond the maximal integration time T , a contradiction.
For the converse implication, assume that S is not closed in the ambient space
V ≡ Rn+1, let S denote its closure, and let q ∈ S \S. Clearly, S is a closed
submanifold-with-boundary of V and the metric induced by the inclusion S ↪→ V
on S will agree with the one induced by the inclusion S ↪→ V on S. With this in
mind, let γ(t) be a geodesic of S which starts at q with initial velocity υ0 pointing
towards the interior of S, and let T > 0 be sufficiently small so that γ(T ) = p ∈ S◦.
Furthermore, let υT = γ˙(T ) be the velocity with which γ(t) reaches p; by the
invariance of the geodesic equation with respect to time reflections, this means
that the geodesic which starts at p with velocity −υT will reach q at finite time
T > 0 with outward-pointing velocity −υ0. Noting that geodesics on S are simply
solutions of (ID-E) for v ≡ 0 and η = 0, and carrying (ID-E) back to X◦ via the
isometry (EC), we have shown that (ID) admits a solution which escapes from X◦
in finite time, i.e. (ID) is not well-posed if S is not closed.23 
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